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I. IN RE ESTATE OF BOZARTH

Reversing the lower court on a narrow issue of law, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District recently held that when life-estate
property consists of financial assets, a life tenant is entitled to consume only
the interest that accrues during her lifetime, but not the principal.1
In October 1974, Harold Bozarth executed a will.2 Harold’s will
provided:

After the payment of my just debts and burial expenses, I will, devise and
bequeath all of my property of every kind, nature, and description, and
wherever situated, and any property in which I have an interest, to my
beloved wife, Frances Bozarth[,] to be hers to use and enjoy for and
during the term of her natural lifetime.
…
At the death of my wife, all that remains of my estate . . . I will, devise[,]
and bequeath the same to any trustee nominated by my said wife, . . . and
all such property shall be held for the benefit of my son[,] Robert F.
Bozarth[,] and the heirs of his body until the youngest of his children
attains the age of forty years, at which time the entire corpus, and any

1.
2.

In re Estate of Bozarth, 2014 IL App (4th) 130309, ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶ 8.
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accumulation, shall be distributed equally among my grandchildren, after
which the trust shall cease.3

Harold died in 1983.4 In August 1984, as executrix of Harold’s estate,
Frances Bozarth filed a final report wherein she stated that she personally
received “mortgages, notes and cash” worth a total of $100,800.79.5
Additionally, pursuant to Harold’s will, she reported that Robert, Harold’s
son from a prior marriage, received $5,000 and $23,555.44 was used to pay
Harold’s end-of-life expenses.6
Frances died in October 2010.7 In the petition to have her will
probated, Robert stated that Frances’s estate included approximately
$257,274.46 in personal property and $780,000 in real property.8
Robert died in September 2011.9
In June 2011, Robert’s children
filed four claims against Frances’s estate, including the claim at issue in the
appeal at bar.10 In January 2013, the trial court denied all of petitioners’
claims.11
With respect to the claim at issue on appeal, the trial court explained
that the petitioners’ claim for $100,800.79 failed for two reasons.12 First,
petitioners had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence what exactly
the personal property listed in Frances’s final report consisted of.13
Secondly, even if the petitioners had successfully identified the property, as
the life tenant, Frances had the right to consume the property in the life
estate because the property cannot be enjoyed without consuming it.14
On appeal, petitioners asserted that as the remaindermen of Harold’s
will, they were entitled to the personal property that Frances had received
from Harold and held as a life tenant.15 Specifically, the petitioners
asserted that they were entitled to (1) “mortgages, notes and cash in the
amount of $100,800.79.”16 Petitioners also claimed to be entitled to
“personal property, including grain and other personal property in the
amount of $67,248.38.”17 However, because petitioners failed to challenge

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 23.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 25–28.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id.
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the lower court’s adverse ruling as to the $67,248.38, the appellate court
promptly disposed of that prong of petitioners’ claim, ruling that the
petitioners forfeited that portion of their claim.18
Reversing the lower court, the appellate court explained that
“[a]lthough it might seem plain that the right to “use and enjoy” life-estate
property would include the right to liquidate and spend the financial assets
at issue, Illinois law provides otherwise.”19 In Illinois, when life-estate
property consists of cash or its equivalent—such as the Corn Belt Bank
assets in this case—the life tenant is entitled to consume the interest that
accrues during her lifetime, but not the principal.20 To be entitled to
consume principle, Harold would have had to have stated expressly that
Frances was authorized to consume principle.21
The appellate court relied on Quigley v. Quigley.22 In Quigley, the life
estate at issue consisted of $29,000 worth of capital stock in various
corporations, bank deposits, checks, and a promissory note.23 The Quigley
court held that the language bequeathing the property to the testator’s
brother “‘for his personal use during his lifetime’” was insufficient to vest
the brother with the right to consume the financial assets at issue.24 The
Quigley court was of the opinion “that a gift ‘for his personal use during his
lifetime’ has no different meaning than ‘for life.’”25 The appellate court
found no distinction between the will’s language in Quigley and the
language of Harold’s will bequeathing property to Frances “to be hers to
use and enjoy for and during the term of her natural lifetime.”26
Thus, as remaindermen, the petitioners were indeed entitled to
$100,800.79.27 This sum is equivalent to the value of the financial assets
that entered into the life-estate corpus at the inception of the life-tenancy
period. Only the interest or return on investment that may have accrued
from the financial assets during Frances’s lifetime was hers to use and
enjoy.
Harold’s will created a life estate. According to the appellate court, an
Illinois life estate does not allow for the consumption of principle.28 If it is
the intent of the grantor to allow the use of principle then the life estate

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Id. at ¶ 42.
See id. at ¶ 43.
Id. at ¶ 41.
370 Ill. 151, 152, 18 N.E.2d 186, 187 (1938).
Id.
Id.
Bozarth, 2014 IL App (4th) 130309, ¶ 38.
Id. at ¶ 44.
Id. at ¶ 42.
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must specifically authorize such distribution. Regardless, the law in Illinois
strictly construed what a life estate includes.

II. IN RE ESTATE OF ZAGARIA
A. Introduction
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District ruled that where a
“presumed dead” respondent is subsequently discovered alive, said
respondent is required to pay attorneys’ fees incurred in administering the
estate from assets returned to him from the now-closed probate estate.29
Interestingly, a majority of the Zagaria court found both statutorilybased fee obligations and equitable principles demanded that respondent
pay attorneys’ fees incurred administering his estate from his personal
estate.30 The Zagaria dissent agreed that statutorily-based fee obligations
arose, however, the dissent disagreed that in this instance respondent is
responsible to pay said fees.31 Instead, the dissent explains, equity demands
that the administrator of the now-closed estate, who benefitted greatly from
the estate, should pay the attorneys’ fees.32
B. Facts
Samuel N. Zagaria, Jr. had no contact with his friends or family for
over seven years.33 His sister, Joanne Corlett, filed a petition with the
probate court for letters of administration upon a presumption of death.34
Upon finding that Zagaria had been neither seen nor heard from since
August 10, 2000, and upon diligent inquiry could not be found, the court
ruled that the facts created a presumption in law that Zagaria died intestate
on August 10, 2007.35 The court issued letters of office of the presumeddead estate of Zagaria and appointed Corlett as independent administrator.36
The primary estate asset was a stock account worth about $500,000.00.37
Attorneys hired by Corlett prepared missing personal tax returns for
Zagaria.38 They recovered unclaimed assets owned by Zagaria that were
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

In re Estate of Zagaria, 2013 IL App (1st) 122879, ¶ 38.
Id. at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶ 54.
Id. at ¶¶ 67–68.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 4.
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held by the State of Illinois.39 Additionally, the attorneys attempted to
collect annuity benefits owed to Zagaria.40 To collect the annuity benefits,
the attorneys were required to produce a “presumed-dead death
certificate.”41 When the attorneys contacted government officials to obtain
such a certificate, they learned that someone had filed an application for
public assistance using Zagaria’s social security number.42 This discovery
ultimately lead to confirmation on June 8, 2010 that Zagaria was indeed
still alive.43
On August 26, 2010, counsel for Zagaria filed a motion to revoke
letters of administration.44 On September 1, 2010, the court revoked the
presumption of death and letters of administration.45 The court also ordered
Corlett to provide a full accounting of the estate and to turn over all
remaining funds in an original stock account to Zagaria.46 At this time, the
estate was worth $366,000.00.47 As the dissent explains, it is undisputed
that during the pendency of the estate Corlett, as administrator, made
multiple distributions to herself.48
The attorneys hired by Corlett continued to work to close the estate.49
During this time, they did not make a request for fees nor did they seek
guidance from the court regarding the proper procedure for handling this
unique set of circumstances.50 The attorneys sent the final accounting of
the estate to the court on November 4, 2010.51 Five and a half months later,
on April 21, 2011, the attorneys filed a petition for attorney fees and costs
totaling $30,859.21.52
On April 11, 2012, the court entered an order finding that the
attorneys’ fees and expenses were fair and reasonable and imposed
judgment against the estate for $27,359.21.53 On September 6, 2011,
Zagaria filed an opposition to the fee petition.54 Upon learning that Zagaria
had a new stock account, the attorneys filed a motion for turnover of funds
to satisfy the fee award judgment.55 On June 1, 2012 the court froze the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 59.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.; see also id. ¶ 56.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
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amount of the judgment in Zagaria’s new stock account.56 On August 29,
2012, the court allowed the motion for turnover against Zagaria.57 Zagaria
appealed.58
On appeal, Zagaria argued “(1) petitioners failed to show cause to
attach his nonprobate assets; (2) his claim to the estate property is superior
to the petitioners’ claim; and (3) the trial court’s order is not supported by
existing law.”59 “Alternatively, Zagaria argue[d] that if he is liable for
attorney fees incurred in the administration of the estate, the attorneys for
the estate owed him a fiduciary duty, and the trial court’s finding to the
contrary should be reversed.”60
C. Analysis
The Zagaria court recognized that administration of an estate upon a
legal presumption of death is indeed permissible under section 9-6 of the
Illinois Probate Act.61 Furthermore, the court explained that such an estate
is administered in the same fashion as an estate of one proved dead by other
means.62 Once the estate is opened, the estate administrator is entitled to
the assistance of an attorney and said attorney is entitled to be paid for his
or her services.63 Additionally, as the majority explains, the attorney’s
compensation for his or her work performed on behalf of the estate is paid
from the estate assets.64
The majority then highlights that pursuant to section 18-12 of the
Illinois Probate Act, funds that were once held by the estate but which are
no longer in the administrator’s possession are nonetheless subject to claims
against the estate to the extent that the distributee’s share of the estate is not
diminished below what the distributee would have received had the claim
been paid by the estate representative.65
Although in this instance the estate was closed and the estate funds
had already been returned to Zagaria, the majority found that the funds in
the new stock account owned by Zagaria once belonged to the estate.66
This fact is undisputed by the dissent.67 Thus, following the estate funds to

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 19.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 16; see also 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-12(d) (2010).
Zagaria, 2013 IL App (1st) 122879, ¶ 28.
Id.
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Zagaria, the majority shows little hesitation in holding that Zagaria should
be required to pay the attorney fees incurred in administering the estate.68
Relying on principles of equity, the majority offers further support for
its conclusion stating if a person received a benefit from another, he is
liable for payment.69
D. Dissent
In the dissent’s view, “while a court of review must follow the
letter and spirit of the law, it must also seek to infuse its rulings with justice
and equity.”70 Corlett, as estate administrator, benefitted greatly from the
estate. When she opened the estate it was worth $518,000, by the time the
letters of office were revoked the estate had dwindled to $366,000.71
After finding Zagaria alive, the dissent points out that the attorneys
for the estate took no steps to seek the court’s guidance regarding the
proper procedure for closing the “presumed dead” probate estate.72
Furthermore, the estate attorneys never sought payments of expenses and
fees within the parameters of the estate while the matter was actively
pending, rather the attorneys waited a considerable length of time before
filing to recover fees and expenses.73
Using the same equitable principles relied upon by the majority, the
dissent would find that because Corlett benefitted greatly from
administration of the “presumed-dead estate,” she too should pay for that
benefit.74
The dissent believes that the estate funds which were distributed to
Corlett, especially those which she took after it became likely that Zagaria
was alive, should be considered constructively held in trust by Corlett for
the benefit of the estate.75
The dissent asserts that “[t]he outcome of this case leaves the
impression that the courts have chosen to rescue the attorneys from a
situation which is of their own making and reward Corlett for her personal
use of estate funds.”76

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at ¶ 51.
Id. at ¶¶ 42–44.
Id. at ¶ 54.
Id. at ¶ 59.
Id. at ¶ 56.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 68.
Id. at ¶ 65.
Id. at ¶ 67.
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E. Conclusion
Although the appellate court offers little discussion of Corlett’s and
the estate attorneys’ efforts to locate Mr. Zagaria prior to the presumed
dead ruling, one must acknowledge that “diligent effort” was found by the
lower court as the court-made “seven-year rule” requires “a diligent
search.” Given this, it is understandable why the court awarded fees and
ordered the previous “estate funds” be used to pay said fees. Without such
an award of fees, the chilling effect on the administration of presumed dead
estates would be substantial as likely few people would be willing to risk
administering these types of estates.
III. SPECIAL NEEDS DECANTING
A. Introduction
On January 1, 2013, Section 16.4 of the Illinois Trusts and Trustees
Act became effective, codifying in Illinois what has become commonly
known as “decanting.”77 Formally titled “Distribution of Trust Principal in
Further Trust,” Section 16.4 validated a trustee power that was already
intuitively inherent under common law. The power to decant permits an
authorized trustee of an existing irrevocable trust (the “first trust”) to find or
create a new or separate trust (the “second trust”) and pour—as one pours
wine from the bottle into a decanter—the assets of the first trust into the
second trust. Recognizing the potential benefit to special needs planning,
the drafters of the decanting statute included procedures specifically aimed
at using decanting for the benefit of trust beneficiaries who have
disabilities, including maximizing a disabled beneficiary’s ability qualify
for valuable, need-based government benefits including Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid.
The potential benefit of decanting in a special needs trust setting is
simple: where the terms of the first trust reduce or eliminate a disabled
beneficiary’s potential to qualify for government benefits or otherwise are
not in the disabled beneficiary’s best interest, the trustee may decant to a
second trust whose terms effectively increase the benefits available to the
disabled beneficiary or, at the least, cause the trust to be administered in a
manner that is in the beneficiary’s better interests. Of course, how this feat
is accomplished, and in what manner, is a bit more complex. A trustee
considering decanting for the benefit of a special needs beneficiary may
have multiple avenues at hand to do so. This article is intended to give a
brief overview of the decanting process in general, explain the methods by
77.

760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4 (2013).
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which a trustee may decant in a special needs context, overview some of the
potential problems with decanting in this context, and review examples of
special needs decanting to aid the reader in understanding how special
needs decanting may work.
B. A Decanting Primer78
Before considering the provisions of the decanting statute specifically
addressing special needs decanting, it is necessary first to understand the
basic decanting process. At its simplest, decanting is the act of “pouring”
the principal of one trust into a different trust. The second trust need not be
a new trust, nor need it be created by the trustee of the first trust. Rather,
the trustee’s authority to decant is drawn from the discretion granted him
under the first trust document, and, as one might imagine, the broader the
trustee’s discretion, the broader the trustee’s authority to decant.
In general, decanting is one of a few tools in the trustee’s “toolbox”
for modifying trust provisions either to assist in the proper administration of
the trust or to better effectuate the settlor’s wishes.79 Among other things,
trust decanting may be useful to modify administrative and investment
provisions, modify fiduciary appointment and succession provisions,
change applicable law, convert certain trusts to more favorable trust forms,
add or remove spendthrift provisions, adjust to changing tax laws or
environments, and of course, protect assets for the use of beneficiaries,
including special needs beneficiaries.
To decant, the trustee must first be an “authorized trustee;” that is, the
trustee must have the authority to distribute principal of the trust.80 Where
a trustee’s discretion is limited only to distributions of income, the trustee is
not an “authorized trustee,” and may not decant. Assuming that the trustee
has some authority to distribute principal, the trustee’s ability to decant is
defined by the breadth of the trustee’s discretion to distribute trust principal.
Where a trustee has absolute discretion to distribute trust principal, the
trustee’s ability to decant is very broad.81 Alternatively, where a trustee’s

78.

79.

80.

81.

For a broader review of decanting in Illinois, in general, see Susan T. Bart, Jennifer L. Bunker &
Sonia D. Coleman, Survey of Illinois Law: Trusts and Estates, Section III, Decanting: Refining a
Vintage Trust, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 615 (2014).
Other tools include trust revision via a virtual representation agreement, see 760 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/16.1 (2013) (authorizing virtual representation agreements in Illinois), trust merger, and trust
division.
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(a) (2013) (“‘Authorized trustee’ means an entity or individual, other
than the settlor, who has authority under the terms of the first trust to distribute the principal of the
trust for the benefit of one or more current beneficiaries.”).
See id. § 5/16.4(c) (2013) (governing the trustee’s ability to decant when the trustee absolute
discretion).
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discretion to distribute principal is narrow, his ability to decant is likewise
narrow.82
1. Trustee with Absolute Discretion
Where a trustee has absolute discretion, his authority to decant is
controlled by Section 16.4(c) of the decanting statute. A trustee with
“absolute discretion” has “the right to distribute principal that is not limited
or modified in any manner to or for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries
of the trust…”83 A trustee whose authority is described as “best interests,”
“welfare,” or “happiness,” is generally considered to have absolute
discretion.84
Under Section 16.4(c), a trustee may distribute the assets of the first
trust into a second trust for the benefit of one, some, or all of the current
trust beneficiaries, and for the benefit of one, some, or all of the remainder
beneficiaries.85 Accordingly, the beneficiaries of the first trust need not all
be beneficiaries of the second trust, although they can be. The trustee may
also grant a power of appointment to one, some, or all of the current
beneficiaries if the beneficiary was entitled to outright distribution under
the first trust, and the power of appointment may give the beneficiary broad
discretion to select beneficiaries.86 The trustee with absolute discretion is
otherwise restricted only by those limitations found in the remainder of
Section 16.4, which significant restrictions are discussed in Section B(3)
infra, or in the trust document itself.
2. Trustee with Less than Absolute Discretion
Conversely, a trustee who does not have absolute discretion to
distribute trust principal is significantly more limited in his authority to
decant. Subsection 16.4(d) controls decanting in a situation where the
trustee’s authority does not meet the ‘absolute discretion’ definition
discussed above.87 In that case, the trustee may decant to a second trust
only if: (1) the second trust has the same current beneficiaries and the same
successor and remainder beneficiaries as the first trust; (1) the second trust
has the same beneficiary class members as the first trust; and (3) the second
trust includes all powers of appointment of the first trust.88 In other words,
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. § 5/16.4(d) (governing the trustee’s ability to decant when the trustee has less than
absolute discretion).
Id. § 5/16.4(a) (defines “absolute discretion”).
Id.
Id. § 5/16.4(c).
Id. §§ 5/16.4(c)(1)-(2).
Id. § 5/16.4(d).
Id. §§ 5/16.4(d)(1)-(3).
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the trustee decanting under Subsection (d) may not decant in a way that
alters the trust’s distributive terms or beneficiaries. However, the trustee
without absolute discretion may still decant for a number of reasons other
than altering the trust’s distributive terms, such as altering administrative
terms, correcting fiduciary succession provisions, and the like. Like a
trustee decanting under Subsection (c), the trustee decanting under
Subsection (d) is also limited by the restrictions found in other parts of
Section 16.4, discussed below, and in the trust instrument.
3. Limitations on the Trustee’s Ability to Decant
In addition to any restrictions on decanting found in the trust
document, Section 16.4 includes several specific limitations on the terms of
the Second Trust designed to both restrict and protect the trustee. Two
particular limitations are notable when discussing special needs decanting.
First, Subsection 16.4(n)(1) provides that a second trust may not reduce,
limit or modify a beneficiary’s mandatory distribution or right of
withdrawal, except where the second trust is a supplemental needs trust.89
As discussed further in Section C, infra, this exception for supplemental
needs second trusts is crucial to the concept of “special needs decanting”
and may even be unique to Illinois’ decanting statute. Second, Subsection
16.4(o) limits the trustee’s ability to decant where doing so would subject
the second trust to claims of reimbursement by a private or governmental
body or reduce or jeopardize an individual’s right to government benefits.90
As discussed later in Section C, infra, this restriction is significant because
it creates an ambiguity when decanting to a supplemental needs second
trust with payback provisions.
In general, the terms of the second trust must further the purposes of
the second trust.91 The second trust may have a term longer than that of the
first trust; however the second trust must have the same permissible rule
against perpetuities as the first trust.92 Assets belonging to the first trust
that are discovered after decanting must be included in the decanting, but
assets acquired by the first trust after decanting remain assets of the first
trust.93 In addition, the trustee may not decant if decanting is specifically
prohibited by the first trust.94 The trustee, generally, may not alter his own
liability, compensation, or eliminate a right to remove the trustee.95 And
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. § 5/6.4(n)(1).
Id. § 5/16.4(o).
Id. § 5/16.4(b).
Id. § 5/16.4(g).
Id. § 5/16.4(i).
Id. § 5/16.4(m) (a spendthrift clause alone does not prohibit decanting).
Id. §§ 5/16.4(n)(2)-(3) & § 5/16.4(q).
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finally, the trustee must comply with certain notice provisions or seek court
approval before decanting.96
4. The Process of Decanting
Briefly, a few notes on the process required to decant. The
“decanting” must be made by a written instrument, signed and
acknowledged by the trustee, and filed with the records of the first trust and
second trust.97 Court approval and consent of the beneficiaries to the
decanting is not required but only if there are one or more legally competent
current beneficiaries and one or more legally competent presumptive
remainder beneficiaries of the first trust and notice of the intended
distribution is given to all legally competent beneficiaries.98 If no recipient
of the notice objects within 60 days, the trustee may decant. If a
beneficiary objects to the decanting within 60 days or if notice cannot be
made because there are no legally competent current and/or remainder
beneficiaries of the first trust, the trustee may seek court approval of the
decanting by filing a petition to order the proposed distribution.99 A trust
beneficiary may also file a written objection with the court.100 The trustee
has the burden of proving that the proposed decanting furthers the purposes
of the trust.101
C. Decanting for Special Needs Beneficiaries
Having reviewed the decanting process generally, let us explore how
decanting can be useful in a special needs context. A general understanding
of special needs estate and trust planning is required. When considering
“special needs planning,” the central concern is generally maximizing the
disabled individual’s ability to qualify for governmental benefits. Although
some benefits may be available to the disabled person simply by virtue of
their disability, additional, valuable benefits are available where the
disabled person is considered “low income.” These “need-based” benefits,
including SSI and Medicaid, are available only to qualifying persons102
whose monthly income and assets fall under a defined statutory cap.103 If a
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 6/16.4(e).
Id. § 5/16.4(r).
Id. §§ 5/16.4(e)(1)-(2).
Id. § 16.4(f).
Id. § 16.4(f)(2).
Id.
For SSI, qualifying individuals are: a) 65 years or older; b) blind in both eyes; or c) disabled, as
that term is defined in Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2014).
103. To qualify for SSI, an individual’s assets must not have a cumulative value greater than $2,000
(excepting the house the individual lives in and one vehicle). 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2014).
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disabled individual’s income or assets exceed the defined cap, the
individual must “spend down” those resources before he will be eligible for
need-based benefits.104
The use of third party and special needs trusts has evolved as a
method of maximizing a disabled individual’s ability to receive government
benefits where income or assets already owned by the beneficiary might
otherwise prevent the disabled individual from qualifying for need-based
benefits. Where a disabled individual is already the named beneficiary of a
trust whose terms require payment of income or distributions of principal to
the disabled individual, the trust will likely prevent the disabled beneficiary
from qualifying for need-based benefits. Where that is the case, decanting
to a supplemental needs second trust for the benefit of the disabled
individual is a possible method by which the trustee can help the disabled
beneficiary qualify for need-based benefits without having to spend down
the trust assets, thereby retaining those assets for other “supplemental”
needs of the disabled individual.
Disabled beneficiaries in Illinois are at an advantage over those in
other states. Lawmakers in Illinois anticipated that a trustee might need to
decant to a supplemental needs second trust, or otherwise decant for the
benefit of a disabled beneficiary. Recognizing the unique challenges that
might arise where a trustee attempted to decant to a supplemental needs
second trust using “traditional” decanting methods, the drafters of Section
16.4 included a specific provision, Subsection 16.4(d)(4), that permits a
trustee to decant to a supplemental needs second trust even though the
decanting may limit the beneficiary’s rights to distributions from the trust
and even though the decanting may expand the trustee’s discretion.105 In
fact, a trustee decanting under Subsection (d)(4) may go so far as to
eliminate a disabled beneficiary’s right to income or principal altogether if
it appears that doing so will increase the beneficiary’s ability to qualify for
government assistance.106 While these provisions seem intuitive, it appears
that Illinois is nearly unique, as one of only a few states whose decanting

104. Social Security Act Program Operations Manual § SI 01150.007 (2013), Rule 12.9.5.
105. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(d)(4) (2013).
106. See id. § 5/16.4(n)(1), which provides: (n) Restrictions. An authorized trustee may not exercise a
power authorized by subsection (c) or (d) to affect any of the following: (1) to reduce, limit or
modify any beneficiary's current right to a mandatory distribution of income or principal, a
mandatory annuity or unitrust interest, a right to withdraw a percentage of the value of the trust or
a right to withdraw a specified dollar amount provided that such mandatory right has come into
effect with respect to the beneficiary, except with respect to a second trust which is a
supplemental needs trust.
See also, id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii) (defining “supplemental needs second trust” as one that the trustee
believes would “allow the disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of government benefits
than the disabled beneficiary will receive if no distribution is made.”).
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statute includes special needs decanting provisions allowing the expansion
of a trustee’s discretion in a supplemental needs second trust.107
Of course, it is not always necessary for a trustee to utilize the
provisions of Subsection (d)(4) when decanting for the benefit of a disabled
beneficiary, but the terms of Subsection (d)(4) are useful where the terms of
the first trust are such that a trustee cannot otherwise decant to an
appropriate second trust under Subsections (c) or (d). Accordingly, when
considering decanting where a disabled beneficiary is involved, a trustee
should consider all potential avenues to accomplish the proposed decanting:
decanting under Subsection (c), when the trustee has absolute discretion;
decanting under Subsection (d), when the trustee does not have absolute
discretion, and decanting under Subsection 16.4(d)(4), when the trustee is
decanting for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary and decanting under
Subsections (c) and (d) cannot be accomplished.
Before addressing the specifics of special needs decanting, one
additional point bears mentioning. There seems to be some difference of
opinion between estate planners as to what type of trust is best suited to
special needs planning—the plain discretionary trust versus the
supplemental needs trust. Although supplemental needs trusts are more
readily identifiable and may help streamline an initial application for
benefits, discretionary trusts are arguably more flexible and easier to
administer. Subsection (d)(4) was drafted broadly to allow for either
approach. However, care must be taken to plan for the distinction between
absolute discretion and no absolute discretion in the decanting context.
1. Special Needs Decanting with Absolute Discretion
Naturally, the first inclination when considering decanting in a special
needs context is to consider decanting under Subsection (d)(4). Where the
trustee of the first trust has absolute discretion, however, it may be possible
to accomplish the trustee’s intended purpose simply by using the decanting
process found in Subsection (c). In fact, if a trustee’s “absolute discretion”
is such that it meets the criteria for a special needs trust found in Section
15.1 of the Illinois Trust and Trustees Act,108 it may be that it is not
107. Other states whose decanting statutes permit some sort of expansion of trustee authority in a
special needs context are: ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(e) (2014), N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 10-6.6(n)(1) (2014), VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(C)(9) (2014), and WIS. STAT. §
701.0418(2)(a)(2) (2014).
108. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15.1 (2013) (which states, “[a] discretionary trust for the benefit of an
individual who has a disability that substantially impairs the individual's ability to provide for his
or her own care or custody and constitutes a substantial handicap shall not be liable to pay or
reimburse the State or any public agency for financial aid or services to the individual except to
the extent the trust was created by the individual or trust property has been distributed directly to
or is otherwise under the control of the individual, provided that such exception shall not apply to
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necessary to decant at all. Rather, the beneficiary will likely qualify or
continue to qualify for governmental benefits under the current trust terms.
Thus, the first step for any trustee with absolute discretion considering
special needs decanting should be to consider whether it is necessary to
decant at all.
Where the trustee determines that the decanting is necessary,
Subsection (c) permits the trustee to decant to any trust as long as the
second trust is to be held for the benefit of one or all of the current
beneficiaries and one, more than one, or all of the successor and remainder
beneficiaries of the first trust. Subsection (c) does not require that all
beneficiaries of the first trust be legally competent, therefore the trustee
with absolute discretion may be able to decant for the benefit of a special
needs beneficiary under Subsection (c) even where one or more of the trust
beneficiaries is disabled. Where one beneficiary is disabled, the trustee
might consider a “partial decanting,” where the trustee decants part of the
trust principal to a separate trust for the disabled beneficiary.
One potential problem arises, however, where the disabled beneficiary
is the sole beneficiary of the first trust. In this case, the trustee may not be
able to decant without obtaining court approval. Recall that Subsection (e)
defines when a trustee may decant without the approval of a court or the
beneficiaries. Subsection (e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(e) Notice. An authorized trustee may exercise the power to distribute in
favor of a second trust under subsections (c) and (d) without the consent
of the settlor or the beneficiaries of the first trust and without court
approval if:
(1) there are one or more legally competent current beneficiaries and one
or more legally competent presumptive remainder beneficiaries and the
authorized trustee sends written notice of the trustee’s decision, specifying
the manner in which the trustee intends to exercise the power and the
prospective effective date for the distribution, to all of the legally
competent current beneficiaries and presumptive remainder beneficiaries,
determined as of the date the notice is sent and assuming non-exercise of
all powers of appointment; and

a trust created with the disabled individual's own property or property within his or her control if
the trust complies with Medicaid reimbursement requirements of federal law. Notwithstanding
any other provisions to the contrary, a trust created with the disabled individual's own property or
property within his or her control shall be liable, after reimbursement of Medicaid expenditures,
to the State for reimbursement of any other service charges outstanding at the death of the
disabled individual. Property, goods and services purchased or owned by a trust for and used or
consumed by a disabled beneficiary shall not be considered trust property distributed to or under
the control of the beneficiary. A discretionary trust is one in which the trustee has discretionary
power to determine distributions to be made under the trust.”)
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(2) no beneficiary to whom notice was sent objects to the distribution in
writing delivered to the trustee within 60 days after the notice is sent
(“notice period”).109

Under Subsection (e), a trustee may decant without approval of the
court or other beneficiaries, but only if the trustee provides the notices
contemplated above. To comply with Subsection (e), there must be at least
one legally competent current beneficiary and one legally competent
remainder beneficiary of the first trust. But in the special needs context, if
the sole beneficiary of the first trust is disabled, there may not be a “legally
competent” beneficiary of the first trust to whom notice can be given. Of
course, this raises the question, what does “legally competent” mean? The
Decanting Statute does not define “legally competent,” nor does the Illinois
Trusts & Trustees Act or the Illinois Probate Act. A related term,
“disabled,” is defined in both the Decanting Statute and the Illinois Probate
Act, although it is not clear that the terms are synonymous.
The Decanting Statute defines “disabled beneficiary” as:
[A] current beneficiary, presumptive remainder beneficiary, or successor
beneficiary of the first trust who the authorized trustee determines has a
disability that substantially impairs the beneficiary’s ability to provide for
his or her own care or custody and that constitutes a substantial handicap,
whether or not the beneficiary has been adjudicated a ‘disabled person. 110

And the Probate Act defines “disabled person” as:
[A] person 18 years or older who (a) because of mental deterioration or
physical incapacity is not fully able to manage his person or estate, or (b)
is a person with mental illness or a person with a developmental disability
and who because of his mental illness or developmental disability is not
fully able to manage his person or estate, or (c) because of gambling,
idleness, debauchery or excessive use of intoxicants or drugs, so spends or
wastes his estate as to expose himself or his family to want or suffering, or
(d) is diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal alcohol effects. 111

As noted, it is not clear that legally “incompetent” and “disabled” are
synonymous, and in fact the fact that both terms are used in the Decanting
Statute seems to indicate that the legislature intended something different
when it chose to use the term “legally competent” rather than “not
disabled,” or the like. The legislature is presumed to have purposely used
the terms it intended, and in fact, at least one Illinois court has highlighted a
109. Id. § 5/16.4(e) (emphasis added).
110. Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii).
111. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-2 (2013).
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distinction between disability and competency in a statutory context.112 In
In re Marriage of Kutchins, the court examined whether a man who had
been declared a “disabled person” and was under the care of a guardian
could bring a petition for dissolution of marriage.113 The court ruled that he
could.114 The test for determining “disability,” the court noted, was more
demanding than the test for determining competency in a dissolution of
marriage context.115 Although the court limited its ruling to dissolution of
marriage, the court’s distinction between “disabled” and “incompetent” is
relevant when considering whether a first trust has at least “one legally
competent current beneficiar[y]” to whom the trustee can provide notice.
Assuming that there is not at least one legally competent beneficiary
to whom the trustee can give notice, the trustee must seek court approval of
the proposed decanting.116 Where the proposed decanting is simple and
easily understandable, or where the decanting is deemed absolutely
necessary, this may be acceptable. However, the trustee may wish to avoid
court involvement for a variety of reasons, including cost and time.
Whatever the reason, if the trustee wishes to decant but cannot without
court approval, the trustee will have to consider whether decanting is
necessary and whether other options are available to the trustee to avoid the
need to decant.
On the other hand, where the first trust has more than one beneficiary,
and at least one beneficiary is legally competent, the trustee may send
notice as contemplated in Subsection (e). If the trustee receives no
objection to the notice, the decanting may go forward without court
approval.117 The trustee could decant to one or more different trusts
qualifying under Subsection (c).
2. Special Needs Decanting without Absolute Discretion
Where a trustee does not have absolute discretion and that
limitation on discretion results in a denial of governmental benefits, the
trustee’s ability to decant is restricted under the general provisions of
Subsection (d) because the trustee is prohibited from altering the
beneficiaries and distributive terms of the trust.118 In a common special
needs situation, mandatory principal distributions or rights to withdraw
found in an existing first trust may prevent a disabled beneficiary from
112. In re Marriage of Kutchins, 136 Ill. App. 3d 45, 46–47, 482 N.E.2d 1005, 1006–07 (2d Dist.
1985).
113. Id. at 46, 482 N.E.2d at 1006.
114. Id. at 47, 482 N.E.2d at 1007
115. Id. at 46–47, 482 N.E.2d at 1006–07.
116. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(f)(1)(b) (2013).
117. Id. § 5/16.4(e).
118. Id. § 5/16.4(d).
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collecting governmental benefits. Because the trustee does not have
absolute discretion, however, he is prohibited from decanting to a second
trust eliminating those provisions. It was this situation precisely that
spurred lawmakers to draft Section 16.4(d)(4).
Nonetheless, there are some circumstances where decanting under
the general provisions of Subsection (d) within the special needs context
may be useful. For example, where the first trust contains restrictions on
the trustee’s authority to distribute but does not contain mandatory
distribution provisions, the disabled beneficiary may be able to qualify for
needs-based benefits under the terms of the first trust. In that case, the
trustee may wish to decant to alter certain administrative provisions but
leave the distributive provisions intact. Examples would be where the
trustee wishes to add a trust protector, alter the trust modification
provisions, alter trust decanting provisions, or alter trust investment
provisions. All of these modifications could be accomplished under
Subsection (d), generally, without resorting to Subsection (d)(4).
3. Special Needs Decanting under Subsection (d)(4)
Where the trustee is unable to decant under Subsection (c) or the
general provisions of Subsection (d), perhaps because mandatory
distribution provisions prevent the disabled beneficiary from qualifying for
needs-based benefits, Subsection (d)(4) exists to fill in the gaps.
Subsection (d)(4) begins:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection (d), the authorized
trustee may distribute part or all of the principal of a disabled
beneficiary’s interest in the first trust in favor of a trustee of a second trust
which is a supplemental needs trust if the authorized trustee determines
that to do so would be in the best interests of the disabled beneficiary.119

Note that, unlike decanting under Subsections (c) or (d), a trustee
decanting under Subsection (d)(4) is not restricted by the amount of
discretion granted him in the first trust. Instead, the trustee may decant to a
supplemental needs second trust, even if the proposed decanting expands or
restricts his distributive discretion, so long as the decanting is in the “best
interests” of the “disabled beneficiary” and the trustee believes the
decanting will allow the disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of
governmental benefits.120 In fact, a trustee decanting under Subsection
119. Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(i).
120. Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii) (the Decanting Statute does not exhaustively define the term “best interests,”
but it does note that “best interests” includes “consideration of the financial impact to the disabled
beneficiary’s family.”) See also id. (“[d]isabled beneficiary” means “a current beneficiary,
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(d)(4) may go so far as to eliminate a disabled beneficiary’s mandatory
distributions of income or principal where doing so would increase the
beneficiary’s right to collect government benefits.121
As the goal of Subsection (d)(4) is to increase the disabled
beneficiary’s ability to receive governmental benefits, the trustee’s power to
decant to a supplemental needs second trust is deliberately broad. The
supplemental needs second trust need not contain any particular “special
needs” language, and in general, the trust need not take any specific form;
third party trusts, pooled trusts, and OBRA payback trusts are all valid
forms for a supplemental needs second trust.122 However there are a few
requirements to which the second trust must conform in order to ensure that
Subsection (d)(4) is used only for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary.
First, the supplemental needs second trust must contain “lesser or
greater restrictions on the trustee’s power to distribute trust income or
principal.”123 Thus, a trustee may not decant under Subsection (d)(4) if the
degree of his discretion will remain unchanged. In such a case, however,
decanting to a supplemental needs second trust may not be necessary, as the
trustee may be able to achieve his purpose—likely to alter administrative
provisions of the trust—using the general decanting provisions of
Subsections (c) or (d).
Further, the trustee must believe that the second trust would “allow the
disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of governmental benefits
than the disabled beneficiary will receive if no distribution is made.”124
Accordingly, even where the trustee’s discretion is altered between the first
trust and the supplemental needs second trust, if the change does not
increase or is not likely to increase the degree of governmental benefits the
disabled beneficiary is eligible to receive, the second trust does not qualify
as a “supplemental needs second trust,” and decanting under Subsection
(d)(4) is not possible.

121.

122.
123.
124.

presumptive remainder beneficiary, or successor beneficiary of the first trust who the authorized
trustee determines has a disability that substantially impairs the beneficiary’s ability to provide for
his or her own care or custody and that constitutes a substantial handicap, whether or not the
beneficiary has been adjudicated a ‘disabled person.’”) See also id. (stating “[s]upplemental needs
second trust” means “a trust that complies with paragraph (iii) of this paragraph (4) and that
relative to the first trust contains either lesser or greater restrictions on the trustee's power to
distribute trust income or principal and which the trustee believes would, if implemented, allow
the disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of governmental benefits than the disabled
beneficiary will receive if no distribution is made.”).
See id. § 5/16.4(n)(1) (An authorized trustee may not “reduce, limit or modify a beneficiary’s
current right to a mandatory distribution of income or principal…except with respect to a second
trust which is a supplemental needs trust.”).
See id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii) (defining “supplemental needs second trust”).
Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(iii).
Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii).
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Additional restrictions are placed on the naming of remainder or
successor beneficiaries to the supplemental needs second trust. The
supplemental needs second trust may name remainder and successor
beneficiaries “other than the disabled beneficiary’s estate,” however the
remainder and successor beneficiaries must be the same as those and in the
same proportions as in the first trust.
D. Potential Problems with Special Needs Decanting
Although a trustee’s ability to decant to a supplemental needs second
trust for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary is deliberately broad, like any
new statute there remain questions as to its use and applicability. Many of
those questions arise in the context of decanting to a payback or pooled
trust, as discussed below.
1. Decanting to a Payback Trust
As noted, Subsection (d)(4) specifically permits a trustee to decant to
an OBRA payback trust for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary.125 By
doing so, the disabled beneficiary is eligible for need-based benefits
immediately, without having to spend down current trust assets, even
though the first trust was funded with assets belonging to the beneficiary
himself.126 The signature feature of the OBRA trust, however, is its
payback requirements. Specifically, to qualify as an OBRA (d)(4)(A) trust,
the terms of the trust must require that upon the death of the disabled
beneficiary the State receive “all amounts remaining in the trust…up to an
amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual
under a State plan under this subchapter.”127
125. An OBRA trust is a highly specialized irrevocable trust sanctioned by Federal and Illinois law that
operates very much like a special needs trust for a person with a disability, but which can be
funded with the ward’s own assets. Use of such trusts allows immediate qualification for “needbased” governmental benefits based on the ward’s disability (“Medicaid”) and also Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) from the Social Security Administration.
See 42 U.S.C.
§1396p(d)(4)(A) (2014) (defining an OBRA special needs trust); see also 760 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/15.1 (2013) (providing authority for OBRA trusts in Illinois).
126. The OBRA trust mechanism is commonly used where a disabled beneficiary has received a
settlement or inheritance that prevents the beneficiary from qualifying for need-based benefits.
Prior to implementation of the OBRA trust concept, disabled individuals who, for example,
received a settlement from a personal injury suit for the cause of their disability were ineligible
for need-based benefits until the settlement amount was spent down. Under the OBRA concept,
the disabled beneficiary maintains her eligibility for need-based benefits but also maintains the
ability to access supplemental income if needed. An expanded discussion of the history OBRA
trust can be found in the article, Joseph A. Rosenburg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with
Disabilities: The Development of A Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91,
91 (2000).
127. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A) (2014).
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The requirement that the State be repaid from remaining OBRA trust
funds upon the death of the disabled beneficiary, and Subsection (d)(4)’s
specific permission of the use of OBRA trusts might at first appear to be in
conflict, however, with another part of the Decanting Statute: Subsection
16.4(o). Subsection 16.4(o) provides:
(o) Exception. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of
subsection (n) but subject to the other limitations in this Section, an
authorized trustee may exercise a power authorized by subsection (c) or
(d) to distribute to a second trust; provided, however, that the exercise of
such power does not subject the second trust to claims of reimbursement
by any private or governmental body and does not at any time interfere
with, reduce the amount of, or jeopardize an individual’s entitlement to
government benefits.128

However, further analysis reveals that Subsection 16.4(o) should
have no negative impact on one’s ability to decant to a payback trust. In
those cases where a payback trust would be required under Subsection
(d)(4), the trust’s interest would already be subject to a claim or
reimbursement by a private or governmental body in nearly all cases. Thus,
it is not the exercise of decanting power that subjects the trust to such
claims—the trust was already subject to such claims. As a consequence,
Subsection 16.4(o) is most likely not an impediment to payback trust
decanting.
Even if this were not the case, in situations where statutory
ambiguity arises the intent of the legislature is of paramount importance.129
That the legislature drafted Subsection (d)(4), and specifically authorized
decanting to an OBRA payback trust, in contrast to the multitude of states
whose decanting statutes do not address special needs decanting at all,
demonstrates that the legislative intent in drafting subsection (o) was not to
prevent decanting to an OBRA payback trust in a special needs situation,
but to permit such decanting for the best interests of the disabled
beneficiary.
Moreover, where a general statutory provision conflicts with a
more specific provision, both relating to the same subject, the specific
provision controls and should be applied.130 In this case, the general
provision found in Subsection (o) (“provided, however, that the exercise of
such power does not subject the second trust to claims of reimbursement by
any private or governmental body”) conflicts with the specific provision
found in Subsection (d)(4)(iii) (“where the first trust was created by the
128. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(o) (2013) (emphasis added).
129. Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 458-59, 781 N.E.2d 261, 267 (2002).
130. People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379, 604 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992).
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disabled beneficiary or the trust property has been distributed directly to or
is otherwise under the control of the disabled beneficiary, the authorized
trustee may distribute to a “pooled trust” as defined by federal Medicaid
law for the benefit of the disabled beneficiary or the supplemental needs
second trust must contain pay back provisions complying with Medicaid
reimbursement requirements of federal law.”)131 Applying this rule, and
particularly in light of the purpose of Section (d)(4), the specific provision
should apply, and decanting to a payback trust permitted.
2. Notice Requirements when Decanting to a Payback Trust
As discussed in Section C, supra, a trustee decanting for a disabled
beneficiary may be required to seek court approval of the decanting if there
is not at least one legally competent beneficiary to whom the trustee can
give notice.132 Implicit in any court proceeding under Subsection (f) is the
requirement that all beneficiaries of the first trust receive notice of the
proceeding and have an opportunity to object. But where the first trust is a
payback trust who must receive notice? As an OBRA payback trust, the
terms of first trust must provide for reimbursement to the State upon the
death of the disabled beneficiary.133 Therefore, since the State has an
interest in the remainder of the trust assets, is the State a “remainder
beneficiary” entitled to notice? Or, alternatively, is the State merely a
creditor of the trust? The answer is not clear from the decanting statute, nor
could any Illinois or related authority be located characterizing the State, in
an OBRA context, as a beneficiary or creditor. Absent a more definitive
answer, a trustee seeking court permission to decant from an OBRA
payback trust to a second trust may wish to proactively provide notice of all
court proceedings to the State to ensure compliance with Section 16.4 and
to ensure that future actions of the trustee or orders of the court are
enforceable.
3. Decanting Triggering Payback Provisions
Another area of uncertainty arises where the disabled beneficiary
currently owes the State money for Public Aid services rendered, and the
trustee of the first trust wishes to decant to an OBRA payback trust for the
disabled beneficiary. In that situation, it is unclear whether the disabled
beneficiary’s outstanding liens must be paid back before the trustee may
decant to the OBRA trust. In at least one case, In re Estate of Calhoun, a

131. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(o) & (d)(4)(iii) (2013).
132. Id. § 5/16.4(e)(1).
133. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A) (2014).
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court found that a disabled beneficiary could not transfer the proceeds of
her personal injury settlement to an OBRA payback trust without first
paying an existing lien held by the State.134 The disabled beneficiary, who
suffered brain injury during birth, received $3,500,000 as a settlement with
the hospital and physicians who delivered her.135 At the time she received
the settlement, the disabled had received $223,223.12 in Medicaid benefits
from the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) for which the State held
a lien.136 When the disabled beneficiary’s guardian sought to transfer the
settlement amount into an OBRA trust for the disabled beneficiary’s
benefit, IDPA objected, arguing that its lien should be paid first prior to the
OBRA trust being funded.137 The Court agreed, finding that Medicaid
provisions required the state to collect any amounts, up to the amount of the
state’s lien, received by a Medicaid recipient as the result of an injury by a
third party, and that these liens must be paid before an OBRA trust could be
funded.138
Calhoun did not involve a proposed decanting, however, and this
distinction may be important. One of the general principals of decanting is
that although the second trust is a separate trust, the grantor of the first trust
is deemed to be the grantor of the second trust.139 Thus, the second trust
has characteristics of both a separate trust, and a continuation of the first
trust. If this is the case and the second trust is a mere continuation of the
first trust, it is possible that payback provisions might not be triggered as
the result of the transfer. Further, unlike Calhoun, the transfer does not
come directly from the third-party settlement funds to the beneficiary to the
OBRA trust, but rather from the trustee of the first trust into what might be
viewed as a new version of that same trust. This line is further blurred in
situations where the decanting occurs before the beneficiary is entitled to
any distributions under the first trust or where the first trust was settled by a
third party.
Subsection (d)(4)(iv) expressly addresses the potential for payback
provisions, providing “[a] supplemental needs second trust shall not be
liable to pay or reimburse the State or any public agency for financial aid or
services to the disabled beneficiary except as provided in the supplemental
needs second trust.”140 It would appear that this provision was added to
address this precise question.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

In re Estate of Calhoun, 291 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 684 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1st Dist. 1997).
Id. at 840, 684 N.E.2d at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 843, 684 N.E.2d at 845.
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(t) (2013) (“The settlor of the first trust is considered for all purposes
to be the settlor of any second trust established in accordance with this Section.”).
140. Id § 5/16.4(d)(4)(iv).
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4. Statute of Limitations
Finally, a word of caution regarding limitations. The ordinary twoyear statute of limitations for decanting does not run for a person who was
under a legal disability at the time a notice or report of decanting was sent
and who then had no personal representative.141 Accordingly, a trustee in
this situation should exercise caution when considering whether to use court
ordered decanting.
E. Decanting Versus Virtual Representation
Finally, where alterations to a trust are necessary for its desired
performance, one potential alternative to decanting is the use of a virtual
representation agreement to alter the terms of the trust by agreement of the
trustee and beneficiaries.142 From a trustee’s perspective, the use of a
virtual representation agreement may seem preferable since it amounts to an
enforceable agreement as to all the beneficiaries, and thus the risk that the
trustee will be criticized for abusing his discretion may be reduced. And, in
fact, the decanting statute specifically highlights virtual representation
agreements as an additional option to distribute property in further trust.
Subsection (j) provides:
Other authority to distribute in further trust. This Section shall not be
construed to abridge the right of any trustee to distribute property in
further trust that arises under the terms of the governing instrument of a
trust, any provision of applicable law, or a court order. In addition,
distribution of trust principal to a second trust may be made by agreement
between a trustee and all primary beneficiaries of a first trust, acting either
individually or by their respective representatives in accordance with
Section 16.1 of this Act.143

In some situations involving special needs planning, however,
decanting may be a better planning tool. Decanting relies upon the
judgment (and discretion) of the trustee instead of the beneficiaries and
those representing the beneficiaries. Virtual representation, on the other
hand, encourages beneficiaries to band together, but when one or more
beneficiaries has a disability, there is a risk that no consensus can be
reached as to how to properly care for the disabled beneficiary. In those
instances where there are only a few beneficiaries, it is possible that there
will be no individual property situated to represent the interests of the
141. Id. § 5/16.4(u).
142. Illinois’s virtual representation statute can be found at 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1 (2013).
143. 760 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/15/4(j) (2013).
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disabled beneficiary. Further, in situations where an OBRA payback trust
is involved, it is highly unlikely that the practitioner could get the Illinois
Department to sign a virtual representation agreement. In these cases,
decanting may be preferable, even if court involvement may be required.
In addition, there could be at least some concern that where a
representative for a disabled beneficiary enters into a virtual representation
agreement and that agreement operates as the beneficiary’s relinquishment
of any form of beneficial interest in the trust, the act of signing the
agreement could be deemed to constitute a transfer for less than adequate
consideration for purposes of a governmental benefits application and
might impact approval of that application. On other hand, with decanting,
the changes to the trust are made in the trustee’s sole discretion. One might
argue that the decanting requirements of providing a disabled beneficiary’s
representative with notice or even seeking court ordered decanting do not
rise to the level of voluntarily agreeing to a modification. Even if the
beneficiary objects to the decanting after receiving notice and the decanting
decision comes before a court, the trustee need only prove that the
decanting “further the purposes of the trust.”144 Once the trustee succeeds
in this proof, it appears that the act can only be challenged if the trustee is
acting in bad faith.145 As a result, unlike a beneficiary’s right to refuse a
proposed virtual representation, there is no unqualified right to object to
decanting in the hands of the beneficiary.
F. Conclusion
If used correctly, the flexibility afforded by Section (d)(4) of the
decanting provisions of the Illinois Trusts and Trustees Act can create new
opportunities for special needs planners. Although the statute does not
address all special needs situations, it does add to the list of tools that may
be used to protect assets for persons with disabilities. Care should be taken,
however. Given the complexity of the statute and the dearth of interpretive
case law, there remain many unanswered questions as to the statute’s
application.
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE ILLINOIS VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION
STATUTE
Significant amendments to the Illinois virtual representation statute,
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1, went into effect on January 1, 2015.146 These

144. Id. § 5/16.4(f)(2).
145. Id. §§ 5/16.4(f)(3), (u).
146. See generally Trusts and Trustees Act, Pub. Act No. 98-0946 (effective date January 1, 2015).
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amendments provide greater certainty as to what matters can be resolved by
a nonjudicial settlement agreement between the trustee and the
beneficiaries. These amendments also expand the ways in which minor,
disabled or unborn beneficiaries can be represented for purposes of entering
into a nonjudicial settlement agreement.
A. A Short History of Illinois Virtual Representation
In litigating a matter involving a trust or a will, traditionally a party
could be bound by a court order only if the party was properly represented.
Wills and trusts, however, frequently have beneficiaries who are minors,
disabled persons, unborn persons or even persons not yet identified. Some
such beneficiaries may have interests that are contingent or even remote.
Virtual representation is a legal doctrine that permits a party having a
substantially identical interest and no conflict of interest on a particular
question or dispute to represent and legally bind a minor, disabled person or
unborn party, or other beneficiaries with contingent interests.
The doctrine of virtual representation developed in the U.S. between
1860 and 1940. Many of the early cases were from Illinois. For example,
Hale v. Hale, held that virtual representation satisfied the necessary parties
rule by both alleviating the necessity of joining the represented parties and
by binding the represented parties.147
1. 1993 Illinois Virtual Representation Statute
In 1993 the doctrine was extended by statute to private settlement
agreements by section 16.1 of the Illinois Trusts and Trustees Act.148
However, the extent of virtual representation under the original statute was
limited to situations in which all the “primary beneficiaries” were adults
and not disabled. Further, the statute did not permit the termination of a
trust and arguably did not permit a substantive reformation of the trust
terms.
2. 2010 Illinois Virtual Representation Statute
Effective January 1, 2010 the Illinois virtual representation statute was
amended to significantly expand the scope of nonjudicial virtual
representation (the “2010 Statute”). Beneficiaries, including primary
beneficiaries, who are not nondisabled adults may be represented by other
beneficiaries. Further, the matters that can be properly addressed by a
147. 146 Ill. 227, 258, 33 N.E. 858, 868 (1893).
148. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1 (1993).
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nonjudicial settlement agreement were expanded and to a great extent
delineated. Further, the statute also covered trust terminations.149
3. 2015 Illinois Virtual Representation Statute
Effective January 1, 2015, the Illinois virtual representation statute is
further amended (the “2015 Statute”) to expand the concept of virtual
representation, to clarify the matters that may be addressed by a nonjudicial
settlement agreement and to make other improvements to the statute.
B. Overview of Changes to Virtual Representation Statute
The changes made by the 2015 amendments to the virtual
representation statute generally fall into four categories: (1) changes to the
types of matters that can be addressed in a nonjudicial settlement
agreement; (2) changes to the rules for representation of beneficiaries; (3)
changes to better define the trusts that are subject to the statute; and (4)
changes to definitions and other clean up changes.150
1. Matters that Can be Addressed in Nonjudicial Settlement Agreement
The 2015 Statute clarifies and modifies the types of matters that can
be addressed in a nonjudicial settlement agreement. The 2015 Statute:
(1) Clarifies that the nonexclusive list of types of matters that can
be dealt with in a nonjudicial settlement agreement is a safe harbor
list, available without the necessity of satisfying the requirement
that it be a modification that a court could approve.151
(2) Provides that a nonjudicial settlement agreement may address
the validity of terms of the trust.152
(3) Provides that a nonjudicial settlement agreement that grants an
administrative power or resolves property questions can do so only
to the extent such change does not conflict with a material purpose
of the trust.153
(4) Clarifies that a nonjudicial settlement agreement may deal with
removal or appointment of a trustee, trust advisor, investment
149. See Lyman Welch and Susan Bart, New Law Promotes Private Trust-Administration Agreements,
97 ILL. B.J. 11 (2009); see also Susan Bart, Illinois Virtual Representation Agreements (2009),
available at http://www.cepcweb.org/assets/Councils/Chicago-IL/library/Handout.Bart.pdf (last
visited October 21, 2015) (providing materials to December 16, 2009 presentation to the Chicago
Estate Planning Council).
150. See generally Trusts and Trustees Act, Pub. Act No. 98-0946 (effective date January 1, 2015).
151. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(A)-(L).
152. Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4)(A).
153. Id. §§ 5/16.1(d)(3)(D-E).
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advisor or trust protector, including a plan of succession for such
offices.154
(5) Clarifies that a change of place of administration may also
change the law governing administration.155
(6) Clarifies that disputes that may be resolved by a nonjudicial
settlement agreement must be bona fide disputes.156
2. Rules for Representation of Beneficiaries
The 2015 Statute amends the rules for representation of beneficiaries
as follows:
(1) Allows a parent to act for a child if there is no conflict of interest as to
the particular question or dispute.
(2) Allows an agent under a power of attorney for property to act for the
principal if there is no conflict of interest as to the particular question or
dispute.157
(3) Clarifies that a specifically named charity can act for itself, but
requires 60 days prior notice of any nonjudicial settlement agreement to
the Illinois Attorney General’s Charitable Trust Bureau if a charitable
interest is involved.158
(4) Substitutes “substantially similar interest” for “substantially identical
interest.”159
(5) Clarifies that a guardian, agent or parent representing a beneficiary
may also represent other beneficiaries with substantially similar interests
and no conflict of interest with respect to the particular question or
dispute.160
(6) Removes questions about the definition of “primary beneficiary” and
the interrelationship of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) by combining those
two subsections into one. 161

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3)(F).
Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3)(H).
Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3)(J).
Id. § 5/16.1(a)(4).
Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4.5).
Id. §§ 5/16.1(a)(1) & (6).
Id. § 5/16.1(a)(6).
Id. §§ 5/16.1(a)(2-3).
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3. Trusts Subject to Statute
The 2015 Statute provides that the virtual representation statute
applies to trusts administered in Illinois (whether or not Illinois law applies)
or that are governed by Illinois law as to meaning and effect, unless the
governing instrument expressly prohibits the use of the statute. Section
16.1(f).
4. Definitions and Other Changes
The 2015 Statute modifies definitions used in the statute as follows:
(1) Expands the definition of “interested persons” to include trust
advisors and protectors when their powers are relevant to the
particular question or dispute.162
(2) Removes questions about the definition of a disabled
beneficiary by substituting “has legal capacity” for “not
disabled.”163
(3) Adds definitions of “legal capacity” and “disabled person.”164
C. Matters that Can be Addressed in Nonjudicial Settlement Agreement
1. Safe Harbor List of Matters
The 2010 Statute listed eleven matters that may be resolved by a
nonjudicial settlement agreement.165 The 2010 Statute also provided that
modifications were valid only to the extent that the terms and conditions of
the modification could be properly approved under applicable law by a
court of competent jurisdiction.166 It was unclear whether matters listed in
section 16.1(d)(4) were subject to the additional requirement that the
modification be one that could be properly approved under applicable law
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Given the sparse and restrictive
Illinois law on trust modifications, imposing the requirement that the
modification be one that could be properly approved by a court created
uncertainty about what matters could be addressed in a nonjudicial
settlement agreement and might have needlessly restricted nonjudicial
settlement agreements.
The 2015 Statute deletes section 16.1(d)(3) of the 2010 Statute to
make clear that the eleven matters listed in the 2015 Statute section
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. § 5/16.1(d)(1).
Id. § 5/16.1(a).
Id. §§ 5/16.1(a)(3)(C) & (D).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4) (2010).
Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3) (2010).
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16.1(d)(4)(A) through (K) are “safe harbor” matters that can be addressed
in a nonjudicial settlement agreement, without any inquiry into whether the
modification could have been approved by a court.167 The 2015 Statute
then adds as an additional matter that can be addressed by a nonjudicial
settlement agreement: “Any other matter involving a trust to the extent the
terms and conditions of the nonjudicial settlement agreement could be
properly approved under applicable law by a court of competent
jurisdiction.”168
2. Validity
The 2010 Statute listed as a matter that could be resolved by a
nonjudicial settlement agreement: “interpretation or construction of the
terms of the trust.”169 The 2015 Statute adds “validity” as an appropriate
matter for a nonjudicial settlement agreement.170
3. Grant of Power and Questions Relating to Property
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to
grant to a trustee of any necessary or desirable administrative power or to
resolve questions relating to property or an interest in property held by the
trust. The breadth of these two areas arguably was restricted by the
requirement, deleted in the 2015 Statute, that the modification be one that
could have been approved by a court. In order to protect the settlor’s intent,
the 2015 Statute adds a requirement that any modification that grants the
trustee an administrative power or resolves a question relating to property
must not conflict with a clear material purpose of the trust.171
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts comments on what is a material
purpose:
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a
purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or
objective on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a
beneficiary’s management skills, judgment, or level of maturity. Thus, a
court may look for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating that
the trust arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of
allocating the benefits of property among multiple intended beneficiaries,
or a means of offering to the beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at §§ 5/16.1(d)(4)(A-K).
Id.
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(A) (2010).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(A) (2015).
Id. §§ 5/16.1(d)(4)(D-E).
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particular advantage. Sometimes, of course, the very nature or design of a
trust suggests its protective nature or some other material purpose.172

4. Trustees and Other Fiduciaries
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to
address “resignation or appointment of a trustee.”173 The 2015 Statute
expands this category as follows:
(F) Removal, appointment, or removal and appointment of a trustee, trust
advisor, investment advisor, distribution advisor, trust protector or other
holder, or committee of holders, of fiduciary or nonfiduciary powers,
including without limitation designation of a plan of succession or
procedure to determine successors to any such office. 174

The 2015 Statute applies not just to trustees, but also to trust advisors
and protectors, regardless of whether they hold their powers in a fiduciary
capacity. Further, the 2015 Statute makes it clear that the nonjudicial
settlement agreement can not only address the immediate succession of
fiduciaries, advisors and protectors, but can also designate procedures for
future fiduciary succession.
5. Change of Law Governing Administration
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to
transfer a trust’s principal place of administration.175 Depending upon the
particular facts, it can be unclear whether transferring a trust’s principal
place of administration changes the law governing administration of the
trust.176 The 2015 Statute specifically permits the nonjudicial settlement
agreement to change the law governing administration of the trust.177
6. Bona Fide Disputes
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to
resolve disputes or issues related to administration, investment, distribution
or other matters. The 2015 Statute clarifies that these disputes must be

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Restatement (Third) Trusts, § 65 cmt. d (2007).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(F) (2010).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(F) (2015).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(H) (2010).
See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 271, 272 (1971).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(H) (2015).
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bona fide.178 Thus an artificially manufactured “dispute” will not serve as
the basis for modifying a trust under the virtual representation statute.
7. Matters Unchanged in 2015 Statute
In the 2015 Statute the following matters continue to be matters that
may be resolved by a nonjudicial settlement agreement: (1) approval of a
trustee’s report or accounting; (2) exercise or nonexercise of any power by
a trustee; (3) determination of a trustee’s compensation; (4) liability or
indemnification of a trustee for an action relating to the trust; and (5)
modification of the terms of the trust pertaining to administration of the
trust.179
D. Representation of Beneficiaries
The 2010 Statute permitted certain individual beneficiaries who
cannot represent themselves to be represented by other specific
beneficiaries.180 The 2010 Statute also provided that certain classes of
beneficiaries may represent other classes of beneficiaries.181
1. Guardian Represents Beneficiary
If a beneficiary is a minor, disabled or unborn person, under both the
2010 Statute and the 2015 Statute, the court appointed guardian of the
estate of the beneficiary, or if none, the guardian of the person for the
beneficiary, represents the beneficiary.182
2. Agent May Represent Principal
If a disabled beneficiary does not have a court appointed guardian, the
2015 Statute allows an agent under a power of attorney for property to
represent such beneficiary if the agent has authority to act with respect to
the particular question or dispute and does not have a conflict of interest
with respect to the particular question or dispute.183
An Illinois Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney for Property
should give an agent the power to enter into a nonjudicial settlement
agreement. The Illinois Power of Attorney for Property authorizes the
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4)(J).
Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4)(B); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(C); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(G); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(I); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(K).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(4) (2010).
Id.
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(4) (2015).
Id.
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agent to enter into “estate transactions,” which are defined in the statute to
include authorization to “assert any interest in and exercise any power over
any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; . . . and, in general,
exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal
could if present and under no disability.”184 Although the power of attorney
statute provides that an agent may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or
amendable by the principal, a modification of a trust by a nonjudicial
settlement agreement should not be considered to be a trust amendment.
3. Parent May Represent Child
Under the 2015 Statute, a parent may represent a minor, disabled or
unborn child if there is no conflict of interest between the child and the
parent, and if the child does not have a guardian or agent who is authorized
to act.185 The parent need not have any interest in the trust.186 If both
parents are qualified to represent the child and the parents disagree, the
parent who is a lineal descendant of the settlor of the trust, or if none, the
parent who is also a beneficiary of the trust, is entitled to represent the
child.187
4. Representation by Beneficiary with Substantially Similar Interest
Under the 2010 Statute, if a minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary was
not represented by a guardian, the minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary
could be represented by another beneficiary with a substantially identical
interest and no conflict of interest. Under the 2015 Statute, if a minor,
disabled or unborn beneficiary is not represented by a guardian, agent or
parent, the minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary may be represented by
another beneficiary with a substantially similar interest and no conflict of
interest. Note that the 2015 Statute requires only that the interests of the
represented beneficiary and the representor beneficiary be “substantially
similar,” not “substantially identical.” Both the determination of whether
the beneficiaries have substantially similar interests and the determination
of whether there is a conflict of interest should be made with respect to the
particular matter being addressed.188 A presumptive remainderman may be
able to represent alternative remaindermen with respect to approval of the
trustee’s account, for example, but not with respect to interpretation of the
remainder provision of the trust. “Substantially similar” does not require
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-4(n) (2014).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(5) (2015).
Id.
Id.
See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 304 cmt. (2010).
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identical interests. For example, if trusts for the settlor’s grandchildren are
the presumptive remainder beneficiaries, but the terms of the trusts vary as
to whether income distributions are required, the age for withdrawal, and
the extent of any power of appointment granted to the beneficiary, the
grandchildren’s interests may still be substantially similar as to matters
other than the construction of the specific trust terms defining the
grandchildren’s interests.
5. Charity May Represent Self
Both the 2010 Statute and the 2015 Statute provide that the Illinois
Attorney General may represent charities or charitable purposes that are not
specifically named or otherwise represented.189 The 2015 Statute now
explicitly states that a charity that is specifically named as a beneficiary
may act for itself.190 Both statutes state that the Illinois Attorney General
reserves the right to file an action or take other steps that it deems advisable
at any time to enforce or protect the general public interest as to a trust that
provides a beneficial interest or expectancy for one or more charities or
charitable purposes whether or not a specific charity is named.191
6. Representative May Represent Other Beneficiaries
If a minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary (Beneficiary 1) is not
represented by a guardian, agent or parent, under both statutes Beneficiary
1 could be represented by another beneficiary (Beneficiary 2) with a
substantially similar (or identical) interest and no conflict of interest. What
was not clear under the 2010 Statute was whether Beneficiary 1 could be
represented by Beneficiary 2’s representative (e.g., Beneficiary 2’s
guardian). The 2015 Statute makes it clear that Beneficiary 1 can be
represented by Beneficiary 2’s guardian, agent or parent, provided that
Beneficiary 1 and Beneficiary 2 have substantially similar interests and no
conflict of interest.192
7. Eliminates Primary Beneficiary Representation
The 2010 Statute provided for two types of class representation. First,
if all primary beneficiaries of a trust were adults who were not disabled or
were represented, the primary beneficiaries as a class could represent all
other beneficiaries who would become primary beneficiaries only by reason
189.
190.
191.
192.

760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(c) (2010).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(c) (2015).
Id.
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(6) (2015).
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of surviving a primary beneficiary. Second, if all presumptive remainder
beneficiaries were adults who were not disabled or were represented, the
presumptive remainder beneficiaries as a class could represent all other
beneficiaries who have successor, contingent or other future interests in the
trust.
Under the statute, a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement requires
the consent of all “interested persons.”193 “Interested persons” includes all
persons and parties whose consent or joinder would be required in order to
achieve a binding settlement were the settlement to be approved by the
court.194 Thus a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement requires that all
successor, contingent or other future beneficiaries be represented, not just
the beneficiaries who would become primary beneficiaries by reason of
surviving a primary beneficiary. Consequently in almost all cases the class
of presumptive remainder beneficiaries would need to consent to the
nonjudicial settlement agreement, and as they would represent all
beneficiaries with more remote interests, there would be no need to rely on
primary beneficiary representation. The 2015 Statute eliminates primary
beneficiary representation because it is unnecessary and causes confusion.
E. Trusts Subject to Statute
The 2015 Statute expressly states that it applies to a trust that is
governed by Illinois law with respect to the meaning and effect of its terms
or that is administered in Illinois.195 The 2015 Statute also states that it
shall be construed as pertaining to the administration of a trust, thus
presumably making it applicable to any trust that is governed by Illinois law
for purposes of administration.196
A trust may by express language making specific reference to Section
16.1 prohibit the application of the virtual representation statute.197 Id.
VI. Definitions
1. Interested Persons.
In light of the expansion of divided trusteeship, under which persons
other than the trustee may have some of the powers traditionally exercised
by a trustee, the 2015 Statute expands the definition of “interested person”
to include “a trust advisor, investment advisor, distribution advisor, trust
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. § 5/16.1(d)(2).
Id. § 5/16.1(d)(1).
Id. § 5/16.1(f).
Id.
Id.
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protector or other holder, or committee of holders, of fiduciary or
nonfiduciary power, if the person then holds powers material to a particular
question or dispute to be resolved or affected by a nonjudicial settlement
agreement.”198
2. Disability and Incapacity.
The 2010 Statute provided for representation of a beneficiary who was
disabled, but did not define disability. In addition, the 2010 Statute
provided for class representation if all presumptive remainder beneficiaries
were either adults and not disabled, or had representatives. It was unclear
whether “disability” meant legal disability, in which case an adult who was
not adjudicated disabled but who lacked capacity to understand the effect of
a nonjudicial settlement agreement, might not be disabled and eligible to be
represented by another beneficiary with a substantially identical interest.
The 2015 Statute adds the following definitions of “disabled person”
and “legal capacity”:
(C) “Disabled person” as of any date means either a disabled person
within the meaning of Section 11a-2 of the Probate Act of 1975 or a
person who, within the 365 days immediately preceding that date, was
examined by a licensed physician who determined that the person lacked
the capacity to make prudent financial decisions, and the physician made a
written record of the physician’s determination and signed the written
record within 90 days after the examination.
(D) A person has legal capacity unless the person is a minor or a disabled
person.199

The Illinois guardianship statute defines disabled person to include an
adult who (a) because of mental deterioration or physical incapacity is not
fully able to manage his person or estate, or (b) is a person with mental
illness or a person with a developmental disability and who because of his
mental illness or developmental disability is not fully able to manage his
person or estate, or (c) because of gambling, idleness, debauchery or
excessive use of intoxicants or drugs, so spends or wastes his estate as to
expose himself or his family to want or suffering, or (d) is diagnosed with
fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal alcohol effects.200
Thus it is clear under the 2015 Statute that a person whom a physician
has determined lacks the capacity to make prudent financial decisions, but
198. Id. § 5/16.1(d)(1).
199. Id. § 5/16.1(a)(3).
200. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-2 (2013)
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who has not been adjudicated disabled, may be represented by an agent,
parent or another beneficiary with a substantially similar interest and no
conflict of interest with respect to the particular question or dispute.
G. Conclusion
The doctrine of virtual representation is a valuable tool for trustees,
trust beneficiaries and their legal counsel. Virtual representation, coupled
with authority to enter into nonjudicial settlement agreements, has potential
to reduce expenses and facilitate the resolution of disputes and operating
difficulties in trust administration.
The 2015 amendments to the Illinois virtual representation statute
make significant improvements to the statute, particularly by permitting
beneficiaries to be represented by parents or agents under a power of
attorney, and by clarifying the matters that may be resolved by a
nonjudicial settlement agreement.

